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1.   Introduction 
The current economic slowdown has focused attention on how far fiscal and monetary polices can 
support demand in a recession. Indeed, since 2001, many emerging economies have used various 
combinations of both policies to dampen the external demand shock. While fiscal policy has not been 
countercyclical in all countries, monetary policy has been relatively more flexible in responding to the 
growth slowdown. These developments raise several important questions: what factors explain the 
relative reliance on fiscal and monetary policies in economic stabilisation in recent years? How far has 
the conduct of monetary policy been helped or constrained by the recent behaviour of fiscal policy? 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses the role of fiscal policy in the recent 
growth slowdown. Section 3 provides an assessment of the effectiveness of discretionary fiscal policy. 
Section  4 turns to the role of monetary policy and highlights the potential coordination challenges 
facing fiscal and monetary authorities. Section 5 focuses on two specific issues for central banks: the 
maturity and composition of public debt and the behaviour of long-term interest rates. 
2.   Fiscal policy in the current slowdown 
The sharp slowdown in external demand in 2001 heightened policy challenges in emerging 
economies. To help revive growth, many countries turned to fiscal and monetary polices to stimulate 
domestic demand. There is as yet no consensus about what should be the appropriate role of fiscal 
policy over the business cycle (see Section 3). In the short run, the possible role that fiscal policy could 
play in stabilising output may occur through the operation of automatic stabilisers and/or discretionary 
fiscal policy, and the appropriateness and feasibility of either may vary according to the individual 
country circumstances. Moreover, measuring fiscal policy has always posed a difficult challenge. 
There has typically been a lack of agreement about the measures of fiscal balance that should be 
used to judge the fiscal policy stance. In the emerging economies context, the challenges of choosing 
an appropriate measure of fiscal balance could come from various sources, including the relatively 
greater importance of state and local governments and quasi-fiscal activities in the fiscal system as 
well as a high degree of off-budget spending.
2  
Table 1 shows the widest official measure of government fiscal balance for 23 emerging economies.
3 
Focusing on the changes in this measure of budget balance, fiscal policy was expansionary in roughly 
half the countries in 2001, coinciding with a sharp cyclical slowdown. Budget balances in Argentina, 
Hong Kong SAR,
4 Israel, Poland, Singapore and Turkey, in particular, showed large negative swings, 
exceeding, in some cases, 4% of GDP in 2001. Deficits also widened, though to a lesser extent, in 
Brazil,
5 Chile, India, Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand in 2001. In other economies, although the 
                                                       
1  The paper is based on information provided by the relevant central banks and has benefited immensely from their 
comments. Special thanks are due to Palle Andersen, John Hawkins, Dubravko Mihaljek, Ramon Moreno, Philip Turner and 
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2  See the paper by Mihaljek and Tissot in this volume. 
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4  Hereafter referred to as Hong Kong. 
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overall budget balance improved in 2001, the contribution of fiscal policy to demand in some cases 
may have been masked by factors such as technical adjustments, off-budget spending and 
unexpected revenue buoyancy. For example, in Hungary, although the official measure of the fiscal 
deficit narrowed in 2001, that based on the European Union definition widened by over 1 percentage 
point of GDP.
6 China and Malaysia introduced large expenditure stimulus measures in 2001 but 
revenue growth resulting from tax reforms more than compensated for the spending increase. In 
Korea, although the fiscal surplus rose in 2001, this mainly reflected the growing surplus of the social 
security funds; abstracting from this effect, the fiscal stimulus was, nevertheless, sizeable. While fiscal 
policy continued to be countercyclical in a number of countries in 2002 the dependence on fiscal 
stimulus seemed to be on the decline. This was particularly true of Asia, where many countries (with 
the exception of China) had planned either to reduce their fiscal deficits or further increase their 
surpluses. On the other hand, weaker recovery or fresh concerns of growth uncertainty led to 
expansionary fiscal policies in Chile, the Czech Republic, Hungary (based on the wider measure), 





  1995 2000 2001 2002
2 
China   –1.1   –2.9   –2.7   –3.4 
Hong Kong
3   –0.3   –0.6   –5.0   –4.8 
India   –6.5   –9.4   –9.5   –8.7 
Indonesia     –3.3   –3.7   –2.5 
Korea   0.7   1.2   1.4   2.0 
Malaysia    2.1   –4.5   –4.9   –4.8 
Philippines    0.6   –4.1   –4.0   –4.0 
Singapore
3   5.4   2.5    –1.8   1.2 
Thailand    2.7   –3.6   –3.9   –2.7 
Argentina   –1.9    –2.4   –6.8   –1.0 
Brazil
4     –7.3   –4.5   –5.2   –7.2 
Chile   2.7   0.1    –0.3    –3.3 
Colombia   –0.4   –5.6   –5.4   –5.0 
Mexico   –0.6   –1.3   –0.7   –0.7 
Peru   –3.0   –2.7   –2.7   –2.5 
Czech  Republic    0.3   –3.1   –2.8   –3.4 
Hungary   –6.7   –3.7   –3.0   –9.4 
Poland   –1.7   –2.1   –4.8   –5.3 
Russia   3.2   1.9   2.9   1.1 
Israel   –4.4
   –2.6   –4.1   –5.0 
Saudi  Arabia    –5.7   3.2   –3.9   –2.9 
South Africa    –4.3   –1.1   –0.5   –1.6 
Turkey    –4.9   –11.4   –16.2   –16.1 
1  As a percentage of GDP, general government.   
2  Projections.   
3  Central government.   
4  Consolidated public sector. 
Sources: JP Morgan; national data. 
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Cyclical adjustment of budget balance  
A more useful way to assess the role of fiscal policy has been to adjust the budget balance to cyclical 
influences by computing what is known as the cyclically adjusted budget balance (CAB, alternatively 
known as the structural fiscal balance).
7 However, as Table A1 in the annex shows, many emerging 
economies do not, at present, seem to adjust their budget balances for cyclical influences.
8 Where 
budget balances are adjusted for cyclical effects, the adjustment is mainly applied to the revenue side, 
given the relatively unimportant role of unemployment benefits and social security related expenditures 
in total outlays. Adjustment for commodity price fluctuations is important in Chile, where changes in 
copper prices have a strong influence on government revenue. In Hungary, extraordinary 
expenditures, which have no impact on demand at the time of their recording in the budget (bank 
bailouts, capital transfers for covering losses of public enterprises and debt assumptions), are taken 
out from expenditure in arriving at the fiscal stance. Other adjustments though unrelated to economic 
cycles include, for example, changes in fixed investment taxes in China, certain compensation 
payments to companies in Singapore and non-current revenues in Mexico. In Indonesia, the entire 
fiscal deficit is treated as structural, even if the government makes a mid-year adjustment to the 
budget based on the latest macroeconomic indicators (including oil prices and the exchange rate). In 
India, the government does not compute a measure of CAB, but research done in the central bank 
indicates that the fiscal deficit is mostly structural.  
One question is whether inadequate adjustment of budget balances for economic cycles could affect 
the central bank’s estimates of the effects of fiscal policy. For instance, if fiscal deterioration is due to a 
temporary revenue loss resulting from a growth slowdown it may not have major implications for debt 
sustainability and interest rate expectations. Thus knowledge about the cyclical budget balance may 
provide important information for the conduct of monetary policy. Nevertheless, while useful in theory, 
it may be hard to compute a satisfactory measure of CAB in emerging economies. For example, 
estimates of potential output are generally believed to be less precise than in industrial countries, 
given a large influence of supply side factors and recent structural changes in many countries. Another 
problem may come from the imprecise knowledge about tax and expenditure elasticities. For example, 
in Brazil, the tax elasticity tends to be overestimated because of the interaction between high inflation 
and tax indexation before 1995 and a sharp increase in revenue due to tax reforms in more recent 
years. Cyclical budget adjustments, therefore, assume a unitary tax elasticity.  
Fiscal stabilisation: automatic or discretionary? 
Table 2 presents estimates of cyclical and structural deficits of countries where such estimates are 
available.
9 The cyclical component of the budget reflects the operation of automatic stabilisers. These 
are changes in government revenues or expenditures that occur in response to fluctuations in demand 
and tend to offset them. Some have argued that automatic stabilisers are the primary mechanism by 
which fiscal policy should react to output fluctuations, as they do not require discretionary tax and 
expenditure changes that may be subject to time inconsistency problems
10 or implementation lags. 
Precisely because they are not discretionary, automatic stabilisers are also less likely to affect market 
expectations adversely. It is also argued that automatic stabilisers are more effective in stabilising 
                                                       
7  Another measure used by some countries to assess the role of fiscal policy is the fiscal impulse, which shows how the fiscal 
stance may have changed with reference to a base year when the actual output was close or equal to the potential. See 
Heller et al (1986) and the paper by Robinson and Phang in this volume for a discussion of the concept of the fiscal impulse. 
Fiscal impulse measures are currently used in Hungary (yearly changes in the primary deficit), Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, 
Mexico, Peru, Poland, Singapore and Thailand for assessing the fiscal stance. 
8  Currently the IMF and the OECD publish cyclically adjusted budget balances for industrial countries following two different 
methodologies (see Hagemann (1999) and Suyker (1999) for details of the two methodologies).  
9  The cyclical and structural budget balances reported in Table 2 may not, however, add to the overall budget balances in 
Table 1 because in many cases they apply to different levels of the government.  
10  This is typically the same problem as that facing a discretionary monetary policy: there is a temptation for the government to 
announce one policy but follow another; see European Commission (2002). Taylor (1995) argues that the possibility that 
government may repudiate a part of its debt (explicitly or implicitly through inflation taxation) demonstrates the classic time 
inconsistency problem facing a discretionary fiscal policy.  BIS Papers No 20  41
 




Cyclical and structural budget balance
1 
 Cyclical  Structural  Output gap
2 
 2000  2001  2002
3 2000 2001 2002
3  2001 
India
4    –0.1   ...   ...    –9.3   ...   ...  ... 
Korea
5   0.2   0.1    ...   1.0   1.3    ...  8.7 
Thailand
5   –1.0   –0.9   –0.6   –2.5   –2.9   –3.5  –5.4
6 
Brazil
5,7   –0.0   –0.3   –0.5    1.9   1.9   1.9  –3.0 
Chile
5   –0.8   –1.5   –1.6    0.0   0.9   0.9  –2.9 
Colombia   –0.5   –0.5   –0.5   –2.9   –2.7   –3.6  0.6 
Mexico
8    0.6   0.0   –0.2   –1.7   –0.7   –0.4  –0.6 
Peru
8   –0.1   –0.5   –0.2   –3.1   –1.9   –2.1  –2.5 
Israel
4   –2.3   –2.5   –2.3    ...    ...    ...  3.6 
Czech Republic
4,7   –0.8   –0.3   –0.5   –1.8   –2.3   –5.5  –2.0 
Poland
4    0.3   –1.2   –0.9   –2.5   –3.3   -4.5  –2.2 
1    As a percentage of GDP.     
2    Defined as the deviation from potential output, in percent.     
3  Estimates.   
4  General 
government.   
5  Central government.    
6  In real terms.   
7  Primary balance.   
8  Public sector. 
Source: Central banks. 
 
Automatic stabilisers generally smooth a large component of the demand shock in industrial countries.  
Estimates suggest that changes in the cyclical budget balance roughly offset one third of the output 
gap in the United States (Auerbach (2002)). In Europe, the strength of automatic stabilisers, as 
measured by the variance of output gap cushioned by changes in cyclical deficit, varies between one 
tenth and one quarter depending on the degree of openness of countries and the structure of their 
public finances (European Commission (2002)). While similar estimates are not available for emerging 
economies, recent trends in the cyclical budget balances reported in Table 2 suggest that automatic 
stabilisers may not be strong in many countries. For example, in 2001 cyclical deficits offset only a 
small component of the output gap in most countries (excepting Chile and Poland).  
A number of factors may account for the weak automatic stabilisers in emerging economies (see 
Box  1 on effectiveness of automatic stabilisers). For example, automatic stabilisers may be 
constrained by the combination of low tax elasticity and a relatively low share of taxes in GDP that 
tends to reduce the responsiveness of revenues to demand shocks (Table 3). The role of expenditure 
stabilisers may be small because of the general absence of formal unemployment and social security 
compensation schemes in a number of emerging economies. At the same time, improving automatic 
stabilisers poses an important challenge: it implies introducing additional welfare and unemployment 
programmes, which countries may be unable to afford without raising their fiscal deficits. Many 
participants in the meeting noted that while changing the composition of expenditure towards demand 
sensitive components can improve fiscal response to cyclical fluctuations, the degree of flexibility in 
actual practice could be very limited. For example, in India, a high share of committed spending 
(interest payments and defence) in total expenditure has reduced the degree of fiscal manoeuvre and 
restricted fiscal policy response during a growth slowdown.  
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Box 1 
What makes automatic stabilisers work? 
Automatic or built-in fiscal stabilisers refer to any element in the budget that acts to offset demand fluctuations 
by affecting government revenues and expenditures (see Auerbach and Feenberg (2000) and Cohen and 
Follette (2000) for a recent discussion). These include all output-sensitive federal and state taxes as well as 
expenditures such as unemployment compensation benefits and other social security benefits that vary 
automatically with business cycles and without requiring prior legislative authorisation. The effectiveness of 
automatic fiscal stabilisers, however, depends on a number of factors. A progressive tax system with a high tax 
elasticity and a high share of taxes in GDP raises the overall response of taxes to economic activity and 
provides a strong stabilising force to the economy. The extent to which government spending varies with output 
also affects the effectiveness of automatic stabilisers. Unemployment benefits are generally sensitive to 
business fluctuations. But certain expenditure components may vary procyclically -  wages, in particular, if 
indexed to inflation - and dampen automatic stabilisers. Nevertheless, the built-in elasticity of the tax system 
has been generally found to be the most significant element of automatic stabilisers. For example, in the 
United  States, tax stabilisers reduce about 8% of the initial shocks to GDP compared to only 2% by 
unemployment benefits (Auerbach and Feenberg (2000)). 
Automatic stabilisers are more effective if they reduce uncertainty about future income (insurance channel) and 
create a wealth effect when individuals believe that changes in tax revenues would not alter the government’s 
intertemporal budget constraint (wealth channel). Automatic stabilisers have strong effects if households face 
significant borrowing or liquidity constraints (liquidity channel). Empirical evidence confirms that a high 
proportion of liquidity-constrained households and a low degree of income inequality that allow tax changes to 
be more dispersed across different income brackets help to improve the impact of automatic stabilisers. 
At the same time, automatic stabilisers have certain inherent disadvantages or may be ineffective in certain 
circumstances. For instance, they are relatively ineffective when the source of the shock to the economy is 
from the supply rather than demand side. Because of their backward-looking nature automatic stabilisers are 
less useful in preventing a demand shock to the economy. 
 
More importantly, countries facing borrowing constraints may be unable to raise their deficits during a 
growth slowdown, thus making automatic stabilisers ineffective. This has been an important factor 
particularly in Latin America where governments faced credit constraints (Gavin and Perotti (1997)). 
One implication is that when governments are highly reliant on external capital markets they have little 
freedom with regard to fiscal policy: their ability to run countercyclical fiscal policy crucially depends on 
the degree of fiscal credibility. Countries with a low degree of fiscal credibility are likely to face credit 
constraints at a much lower threshold debt/GDP ratio than those with a higher degree of credibility. As 
a result, while an adverse demand or commodity price shock reduces revenues, governments may be 
forced to cut spending to restore their external creditworthiness. A consensus view in the meeting was 
that removing borrowing constraints posed long-term fiscal challenges, including strengthening 
privatisation, introducing long-term tax reforms, reducing contingent fiscal burdens and committing to a 
medium-term fiscal plan that enhances market confidence about the fiscal regime. 
This also raises a related question: do fiscal rules have implications for automatic stabilisers? Given 
the limited experience, empirical evidence is still inconclusive about the working of fiscal rules and 
whether they affect automatic fiscal flexibility. Some argue that rules by definition reduce the automatic 
response to cyclical fluctuations and in this sense they are sub-optimal.
12 In particular, rules that set 
overall ceilings on deficits or debts may not leave sufficient room for budget adjustments in the event 
of a large negative demand shock (Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1995)). On the other hand, others 
argue that when rules are accompanied by strong commitments and increased fiscal transparency, 
they improve fiscal performance and may even leave scope for occasional deviation from them without 
seriously affecting credibility (IMF (2001)). 
                                                       
12  From a theoretical standpoint, deficit rules (balanced budget laws) are sub-optimal since they prevent budget adjustments 
needed for intertemporal tax and consumption smoothing (Alesina and Perrotti (1999)). Nevertheless, many countries have 
introduced fiscal rules with a view to removing political bias from fiscal policy and have included contingent provisions in the 
law to allow for exigencies. The limited experience in the context of emerging economies suggests that fiscal rules have 
been breached by many countries, and one of the contributory factors has been their introduction during an economic 






2 Direct  taxes




Asia     14.1   33.3   15.8   28.4 
Latin America    14.7   39.4   14.0   18.4 
Central and eastern Europe   28.4   50.7   12.4   10.0 
Memo item:      
G7   27.1   70.0   11.9    10.8
5 
Note: Regional simple averages refer to the following countries: Asia (China, India, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the 
Philippines, Singapore and Thailand); Latin America (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru) and central and 
eastern Europe (the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Russia). 
1  Averages  for  the  period  1997-2001.   
2  As  a  percentage  of  GDP.   
3    As a percentage of total revenues.     
4  As  a 
percentage of government current expenditures.   
5  Excludes Japan. 
Sources: IMF, Government Finance Statistics; national data. 
 
Other factors may be equally important. For example, the paper by Chung in this volume attributes the 
smaller role of automatic stabilisers in Korea than other OECD countries to the relatively low share of 
public finance in GDP (25% of GDP). In some cases, it may also be the result of a conscious effort by 
the authorities to avoid countercyclical bias in fiscal policy. For example, the paper by Nasution in this 
volume points out that in Indonesia the primary goal of fiscal policy is to balance the budget 
irrespective of the economic cycle. It could also be argued that weak automatic stabilisers do not 
matter to the extent that governments show sufficient flexibility and discipline in running a discretionary 
fiscal policy. For instance, in Malaysia, the government consistently maintained a surplus in its current 
operations, which enabled it to run an active discretionary fiscal policy without having to depend on 
automatic stabilisers. The paper by Vijayaledchumy in this volume points out that such a fiscal stance 
has lowered long-term fiscal risks in Malaysia and strengthened the role of countercyclical fiscal policy. 
In fact, as Table 2 shows, many countries used discretionary fiscal policy to offset demand fluctuations 
in the current cycle. Structural deficits were generally large and have widened in the past two years in 
Colombia, the Czech Republic, Peru, Poland and Thailand. Moreover, to the extent that countries 
implemented off-budget spending programmes, structural deficit measures reported in Table 2 may 
understate the true magnitude of discretionary fiscal operations.
13 For instance, in Mexico, investment 
spending was boosted in recent years by encouraging the private sector to build infrastructure projects 
through access to government guaranteed borrowing. Including such spending programmes and 
adjusting the budget for other effects, the government’s structural deficit increased to over 2.5% of 
GDP in 2001 from below 1% estimated by the conventional deficit measure (see the paper by Sidaoui 
in this volume). In Hungary, off-budget infrastructure spending financed through state-owned banks 
and state asset management companies has been an important source of fiscal stimulus. Extra-
budgetary spending has also been high in the Czech Republic and Poland. Some countries (for 
example China, the Philippines and Thailand) also attempted to provide fiscal stimulus by front-loading 
expenditures in the early part of the year when private demand was weak with the intention (not 
always successful) of cutting back as the economy recovers. Such temporary through-the-year 
stimulus programmes may have been successful in kick-starting the economy, although their ultimate 
effect remains unclear. 
                                                       
13  There are other limitations to the use of the CAB as an indicator of fiscal policy stance (see, for example, Blanchard 
(1990a), Chouraqui et al (1990) and Heller et al (1986)). For example, the CAB does not take into account expectations of 
future fiscal policy for private sector decisions; it is based on the assumption that consumption depends on current income 
and tax and expenditure changes have similar impacts on demand; and it does not correct the deficit for movement of key 
variables such as inflation and the interest rate.  In addition, Auerbach (2002) argues that CAB calculated by excluding 
automatic stabilisers does not necessarily provide the impact of contemporaneous changes in fiscal policy since tax 
changes may include phase-in provisions that have impacts going beyond the current year or even the current cycle. 44  BIS Papers No 20
 
Still others attempted to alter the composition of government spending to make fiscal stimulus more 
effective or add net stimulus to the economy. In Chile, given the structural surplus rule, the 
government attempted to change the composition of public expenditure in favour of employment-
oriented programmes. Similarly, in Thailand, a major thrust of fiscal policy has been to boost rural 
demand by promoting special spending programmes in the village and small enterprise sector. In 
Malaysia, the government selected capital projects thought to have large multiplier values. The paper 
by Kiss in this volume explains why the composition of fiscal stimulus might be important. In Hungary, 
while an increase in government spending on wages and transfers is found to affect demand more 
quickly than a similar increase in investment spending or a reduction in consumption taxes, the former 
kinds of stimulus also lead to a prolonged deterioration in the external balance and higher inflation.  
Country experiences also reveal several practical considerations, limiting the use of expenditure 
switching polices to boost demand. For example, in India timely switching of expenditure to 
infrastructure projects, with strong backward and forward economic linkages, has not proved easy in 
view of prevailing spending rigidities. Moreover, the effectiveness of such stimulus measures was 
hampered by long implementation lags. The paper by Farfán in this volume notes that, while a shift of 
expenditure from imported to domestic goods could help demand, the complex budgetary process 
reduced its practical use. 
3.   Is fiscal policy effective? 
The issues 
There is little consensus about the impact of fiscal policy on the economy. One mainstream view has 
been that government should actively use a countercyclical fiscal policy to offset demand shocks to 
the economy.
14 According to this view, the role for a discretionary fiscal policy is greater when the 
economy is hit by a large demand shock and automatic stabilisers cannot provide a sufficient degree 
of stabilisation to the economy. Others have argued that, while a discretionary fiscal policy should 
generally be avoided, the need for such a policy may arise in special circumstances: for instance, 
when monetary policy is constrained because of a fixed exchange rate or by the zero lower bound on 
the nominal interest rate. 
A contrary view asserts the relative ineffectiveness of fiscal policy.
15 According to this view, temporary 
increases in the fiscal deficit have little impact on demand because they imply future tax increases. 
Permanent changes to fiscal policy to boost the economy, notwithstanding their demand impact, give 
rise to the problems of persistent deficits and high real interest rates. In the context of the US 
economy, Blanchard and Perotti (1999) show that fiscal multipliers are usually small, often close to 
one, and over a long period fiscal deficits largely crowd out private investment. Moreover, Perotti 
(2002) argues that the effectiveness of fiscal policy may have declined in the past two decades. Some 
of the plausible, though inconclusive, factors are growing openness, the move to more flexible 
exchange rates and changes in the behaviour of monetary authorities. 
Others argue that fiscal policy may even have a negative multiplier effect in the presence of a high 
public debt.
16 According to this view, credible fiscal adjustments aimed at permanently reducing public 
debt can generate growth by lowering the future tax burden, real interest rates and the credit risk 
premium on international bonds. This view has gained ground from the experience of successful fiscal 
                                                       
14  This is alternatively known as the Keynesian view. This view assumes that individuals are short-sighted and credit-
constrained and hence respond to variations in their disposable income brought about fiscal policy by changing 
consumption.  
15  This is familiarly known as the neoclassical view (see, for example, Bernheim (1989) and Feldstein (1982)). According to this 
view, while discretionary fiscal policy to fine-tune the economy should be avoided, government should allow automatic 
stabilisers to even out deficits and surpluses over the cycle (Barro (1979)). An alternative and extreme view is the Ricardian 
school, which argues that tax and debt financing of expenditure have similar impacts on demand (Barro (1974)). 
16  See, for example, Blanchard (1990b), Giavazzi and Pagano (1990a), Giavazzi et al (2000) and Perotti (1999). BIS Papers No 20  45
 
adjustments that seem to have led to a sharp rise in investment and growth.
17 An important prediction 
of this view has also been that fiscal policy may have significant non-linear effects. At low levels of 
public debt, fiscal policy generates the usual Keynesian effects. However, when the debt levels rise to 
some critical limit, fiscal policy has unconventional contractionary effects.
18 
Notwithstanding the competing views, several practical considerations may limit the use of 
discretionary fiscal policy in emerging economies. In particular, when the historical association 
between the fiscal deficit and inflation is strong, countries may be constrained in using the fiscal policy 
option.
19 Indeed, this is a key point stressed by many country papers in this volume. The concern is 
that an expansionary fiscal policy may threaten long-run debt sustainability and raise inflation 
expectations that could adversely affect the central bank’s ability to control inflation. Moreover, in 
relatively open economies fiscal multipliers may be small due to a high degree of external leakage.
20 In 
such circumstances, fiscal expansion to boost demand is likely to worsen the current account balance, 
with adverse implications for external sustainability.  
External constraints on running countercyclical policies may be particularly severe in countries with a 
history of marked exchange rate volatility if fiscal expansion weakens investors’ confidence and 
triggers speculative currency pressures. In Colombia, fiscal expansion adversely affected the 
exchange rate because markets at times doubted the government’s ability to maintain long-term fiscal 
sustainability, thereby raising credit risk premia and expectations of devaluation (see the paper by 
Uribe and Lozano in this volume). On the other hand, as the recent Argentine experience 
demonstrated, when the exchange rate is fixed, long-term fiscal sustainability assumes a critical 
importance for continued market confidence on the peg. Even though Hong Kong has no public debt 
and has maintained a large fiscal reserve to support short-term fiscal stimulus to the economy, 
investors’ perceptions about government’s long-run fiscal soundness has had important consequences 
for how they view the sustainability of the currency board (see the paper by Peng et al in this volume).   
Fiscal policy and stabilisation: the historical experience  
One indicator of the relative role of fiscal policy in macroeconomic stabilisation is the share of the 
government sector in total demand. In Asia, following the reliance by many countries on fiscal stimulus 
after the 1997-98 financial crisis, the share of government consumption and capital spending 
(excluding bank restructuring costs) in total demand increased by over 1 percentage point between 
1997 and 2000, with more substantial increases in Korea, Malaysia and Singapore. In contrast, in 
Latin America the contribution of the government sector to total demand has either remained stagnant 
(for example, Mexico and Peru) or fallen (for example, Brazil) in recent years.  
A further way to look at the influence of fiscal policy on growth has been to see how the fiscal balance 
has moved in relation to economic fluctuations over a longer time horizon, including several cycles. Do 
balances respond differently to an upturn than to a downturn? Does the degree of response vary from 
a boom to a sharp growth slowdown? Table 4 reports the average changes in the growth rate and the 
fiscal balance in different regions during two periods - “good” and “bad” - with the former representing 
those years when growth improved by more than 1.5 percentage points over the previous year since 
1980 and the latter in which it fell by a similar order. The table does not show any significant 
differences in fiscal responses of emerging economies to economic fluctuations: in all regions, fiscal 
balances improved during “good” times and deteriorated during “bad” times. Nevertheless, some 
difference is apparent with respect to the degree of fiscal flexibility of different regions during a 
downturn compared to an upturn. In Asia, for example, fiscal balances seem to deteriorate faster 
during times of large growth declines than they improve during large growth increases. In Latin 
America, fiscal flexibility seems to be much lower in a downturn than in an upturn.
21 Fiscal policy 
                                                       
17  The often cited examples are the fiscal adjustment experiences of Denmark and Ireland in the early 1980s; see Giavazzi 
and Pagano (1990a). 
18  See, for example, Perotti (1999) and Sutherland (1997). 
19  Fischer et al (2002) show that the link between fiscal deficit and inflation is much stronger when inflation is high. 
20  This is cited as an important reason why fiscal expansion may be relatively unsuccessful in economies such as Hong Kong 
and Singapore. 
21  Gavin et al (1996), Gavin and Perotti (1997) and IMF (2002b) argue that fiscal policy has been procyclical in Latin America.  46  BIS Papers No 20
 
response to growth in central and eastern Europe appears to be stronger than other regions during 
both “good” and “bad” periods.  
 
Table 4 
Fiscal balance and growth
1 
Good years
2 Bad  years
3 
 
GDP growth  Fiscal balance
4 GDP  growth Fiscal  balance
4 
Asia   3.2   0.5    –3.9    –1.0 
Latin America    3.9    0.7   –3.0   –0.2 
Central and eastern Europe   2.0   2.5    –1.8    –1.3 
Memo item:      
OECD   2.2   0.4    –2.2    –0.9 
1  Average of changes; period 1980-2001.   
2  Defined as those with increases in real GDP growth equal to or greater than 
1.5 percentage  points.   
3    Defined as those with declines in real GDP growth equal to or greater than 1.5  percentage 
points.   
4  As a percentage of GDP. 
Sources: OECD; national data. 
 
Many factors may account for the observed difference in regional fiscal policy responses. For 
example, the relatively stronger fiscal response of the East Asian countries to a growth slowdown has 
been attributed to factors such as their historical record of fiscal soundness prior to the 1997-98 crisis, 
low inflation, small external financing requirement and a relatively less volatile exchange rate 
(Table 5). Structural factors such as a relatively low inequality of income, requiring less redistributive 
bias in fiscal policy, and a diversified tax base have also been cited as important. However, the public 
debt ratios in some countries have risen to high levels in recent years, suggesting that the room for 
manoeuvre on fiscal policy may be declining in much of Asia.  
Some blame Latin America’s borrowing constraint for its weak fiscal response during a recession 
(Gavin and Perotti (1997)). This constraint has been generally linked to the region’s fragile fiscal 
structure (eg high dependence on commodity taxes and procyclical movement of expenditure), high 
degree of macroeconomic volatility and a large external financing need in the budget. Moreover, since 
fiscal performance and macroeconomic volatility tend to be closely correlated in Latin America, an 
increase in the fiscal deficit is likely to weaken investors’ confidence during a growth slowdown and 
increase credit spreads, preventing countries from running a countercyclical fiscal policy.  
One question that arises is the extent to which a procyclical fiscal response may be considered 
appropriate in certain cases. One view is that if the objective is to reduce output volatility then a 
procyclical fiscal policy is undesirable. In this case, the economy is simultaneously subject to two types 
of negative shocks - one arising from the initial adverse demand and the other a negative policy with 
reinforcing effects. The resulting output volatility can be severe, depending on how other policies move 
in response to the shock. An opposite view is that a procyclical fiscal policy is not necessarily bad for 
the economy if it helps to reduce long-term fiscal risks and improves financial market confidence. In 
such circumstances, it could have substantial positive implications for the economy and may even 
enhance effectiveness of other polices. The recent experience of Brazil appears to support this view. 
Brazil responded to the recent financial market volatility by overachieving its primary surplus target 
during an economic downswing. Notwithstanding its short-term negative demand effects, the fiscal 
tightening helped to restore investor confidence in Brazil, lowering credit spreads and reopening the 













average  2000-02  1990s 
average  2000-02  1990s 
average  2000-02 1996  2001 
Asia 7.2  3.1  2.9  9.2 3.8 1.6 36.0  58.0 
Latin America  435.4  5.9  –7.1 –8.5 14.9  3.8  29.0 37.0 
Central and eastern Europe 95.1  9.4  0.6  7.0  33.7
5  1.9
5 44.0  41.0 
Others
4 25.0  15.1  –3.4  2.2  2.7 3.9  68.0  66.0 
1  In billions of USD.   
2  Measured as the standard deviation over one-month changes in the bilateral exchange rate against 
the US dollar.     
3    As a percentage of GDP.     
4    Average for Israel, Saudi Arabia, South Africa and Turkey.     
5  Bilateral 
exchange rate against the euro.  
Sources: Bloomberg; Datastream; IMF; national data. 
 
The paper by Sidaoui in this volume illustrates the dilemma facing the central bank from a procyclical 
fiscal policy. In Mexico, a procyclical fiscal bias has increased output volatility, requiring monetary 
policy to be aggressive in addressing demand fluctuations. This has, in turn, made interest rates more 
volatile. At the same time, since a procyclical fiscal policy preserved government’s fiscal credibility, it 
allowed monetary policy to play a more effective role in the economy. On balance, Sidaoui argues that 
a procyclical fiscal policy has worked well in the Mexican context: it has focused fiscal policy on 
medium-term consolidation and lowered fiscal risks from government’s rising contingent liabilities.  
Can a medium-term orientation help?  
Recent efforts to improve fiscal policy effectiveness have generally been directed at eliminating 
structural deficits and balancing the budget over the cycle. There have been several motivating 
factors. One is that a greater commitment of the government to maintain medium-term fiscal 
sustainability will enhance its fiscal credibility, leading to positive economic outcomes. Moreover, 
monetary policy is generally thought to be more effective when the private sector believes that the 
government would not resort to inflationary deficit financing. Yet another argument is that democratic 
budgetary processes tend to be biased towards short-term employment and output goals. To offset 
this political bias, it is necessary to focus fiscal policy on medium-term goals and commit the political 
authorities to formal institutional arrangements such as a deficit or debt rule.
22  
Can a medium-term focus make countercyclical fiscal policy easier? Country experiences have 
generally been mixed. For example, in Chile the recent effort at improving medium-term fiscal 
orientation seems to have enhanced the role of automatic stabilisers (see Box 2). In 2001, faced with a 
growth slowdown, Chile allowed its budget balance to go into deficit to accommodate the cyclical 
effects although, under its new fiscal consolidation programme, the government is committed to 
maintaining a structural fiscal surplus. Despite adverse external developments, international bond 
spreads suggest that market confidence in Chile’s fiscal policy improved. The paper by Marshall in this 
volume points out that the new fiscal rule has strengthened the response of fiscal policy to economic 
fluctuations and provided conditions for a stable monetary regime. To the extent that improved fiscal 
credibility reduced financing cost for the private sector (through lower sovereign spreads), it had 
favourable long-term implications for private investment and growth (Le Fort (2002)).   
 
                                                       
22  See, for example, Alesina and Perotti (1995), Poterba (2000) and Koptis (2001).  48  BIS Papers No 20
 
Box 2 
Chile’s experience with medium-term fiscal policy 
As part of its effort to improve fiscal credibility, Chile introduced a new fiscal policy framework in 2000 aimed at 
achieving and maintaining a structural surplus of 1% of GDP in the central government budget starting in 2001. 
An important objective of the new policy rule is to anchor long-term fiscal expectations and allow automatic 
stabilisers to play an effective countercyclical role (see Ministry of Finance, Chile (2000)). The new fiscal rule is 
also expected to: help broaden the planning horizon of the public institutions and thereby avoid the potential 
procyclical expenditure behaviour in the event of a budget adjustment; boost government saving and 
investment; and maintain fiscal sustainability in the light of the government’s contingent liabilities.  
In operating the rule, the central government’s structural revenues are computed using estimates of potential 
output and the long-run copper price. Revenue and expenditure plans are then set so as to achieve the ex ante 
structural surplus target. In the event of GDP and copper prices deviating from their potential and long-term 
values, the cyclical budget balance is allowed to adjust to the full extent. The central government has pursued 
a tight fiscal policy since the introduction of the new policy rule and achieved an actual structural surplus of 
0.9% of GDP in 2001. The overall budget balance, nevertheless, was in deficit in 2001, reflecting the cyclical 
impacts on the budget. To promote transparency in the estimation of the structural surplus, the government has 
instituted a commission of experts, who recommend the reference copper price and the output gap each year. 
The degree of transparency in operating the rule is expected to strengthen with the government adopting the 
IMF fiscal transparency codes (IMF (2002a)). 
The commitment of the authorities to the new fiscal policy rule has been strong. Despite the recent increase in 
the unemployment rate, the government has resisted the pressure to relax fiscal policy. Market confidence in 
Chile’s fiscal soundness has strengthened following the achievement of the targeted structural surplus in 2001. 
 
On the other hand, Peru’s recent experience suggests that fiscal adjustments to improve medium-term 
sustainability may have short-term growth implications, especially if fiscal rules do not allow for 
sufficient adjustment of balances during a severe recession. The fiscal transparency and responsibility 
law in Peru, introduced in 1999, envisaged a maximum fiscal deficit target of 2% of GDP in the event 
of a recession. But this limit, found inadequate to cushion the economy against the global slowdown in 
2001, was suspended. The law is now being revised to include a transitional phase for reaching the 
medium-term target following an extraordinary situation (implying a deviation from the target) and also 
provisions that would ensure a return to the fiscal target.
23  
Several alternatives have recently been suggested to improve fiscal policy responses to cyclical 
fluctuations without sacrificing the medium-term fiscal objective. For example, some have argued that 
fiscal authorities should respond to output fluctuations through a fiscal policy reaction function similar 
to a monetary policy reaction function (Taylor (2000a)). Such a reaction function could link the actual 
deficit to a constant structural surplus (to provide the medium-term fiscal anchor) and the output gap. 
The reaction coefficient on the output gap could be chosen depending on the strength of the 
authorities’ desire to smooth output fluctuations by using fiscal policy.
24 To prevent misuse of the rule, 
its proponents have proposed an independent fiscal board along the lines of monetary policy boards 
for its implementation.
25 One important advantage of such a rule is that it would reduce the time lag of 
policy response and might insulate fiscal policy from political pressures.  
At the same time, several practical difficulties could complicate the operation of a fiscal policy reaction 
function. For example, it is argued, democratic concerns could make its implementation difficult. There 
are also disagreements about the operating mechanism. Should it include only tax adjustments or 
spending changes, or both? What should be the magnitude of response? Who should coordinate 
policy - an independent fiscal or monetary policy board?  
                                                       
23  See the paper by Farfán in this volume. 
24  In the US context, Taylor (2000a) has proposed a fiscal policy reaction function of the following type: S = s + 0.5 (y - y*), 
where S is the overall budget balance as percentage of GDP, y and y* are logs of actual and potential output and the 
constant (s) is the ratio of targeted structural budget surplus to GDP. 
25  Among the other proponents of an independent fiscal board are Eichengreen et al (1999) and Wyplosz (2001). Practical 
limitations to operating a fiscal policy reaction function are discussed by European Commission (2002) and Seidman (2001).  BIS Papers No 20  49
 
4.   Can monetary policy take up the slack?  
Monetary policy in the recent slowdown 
In a number of emerging economies, monetary policy has been relaxed in quite a substantial way over 
the past two years. As Table 6 shows, many countries cut policy rates in 2001, some to historically low 
levels: rate cuts were typically accelerated during the second half of 2001 following increased 
uncertainty in the global economy. Monetary stimulus was also significant in 2002, even though a few 
countries rolled back rate cuts or further raised rates during the year.  
The exchange rate also seems to have played a major role in demand stimulation in the current cycle - 
in particular during 2002, as a number of countries saw significant falls in their real exchange rates. In 
Latin America, exchange rate depreciations have been led by a series of recent financial crises. 
Similarly, speculative currency pressures played an important role in South Africa in 2001, while much 
of the recent appreciation appears to be a correction of that overshooting. In central and eastern 
Europe, rising capital inflows have played an important part in the recent appreciation of the exchange 
rate.  
Some of the general factors that may explain the relatively greater reliance put on monetary policy in 
the current slowdown are the recent decline in inflation, large negative output gaps in many countries 
and the substantial global monetary easing since the beginning of 2001. In Asia, inflation has declined 
to low levels during the past two years, while China and Hong Kong have seen price declines. This 
was also true for a number of countries in Latin America (notably Columbia, Peru and Mexico) where 
inflation has fallen to low or moderate levels. On the other hand, inflationary pressures increased in 
others (Argentina, Brazil and Venezuela), led by problems of debt sustainability, political uncertainty 
and large depreciations of the exchange rate. In central and eastern Europe, strong exchange rates 
have generally lowered inflation and external competitiveness, prompting central banks to cut interest 
rates. 
The sharp cuts in policy rates have also been explained by many analysts as a pre-emptive move by 
central banks in the absence of overt inflationary pressures and expectations of a prospective 
deterioration in demand conditions. Other practical considerations may have also played a role in 
putting more emphasis on monetary policy in output stabilisation. For example, monetary policy lags 
(decision and implementation lags) are generally shorter than those of fiscal policy and its impact is 
thought to be more certain. Moreover, interest rates can be adjusted more flexibly than tax and 
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Table 6 
Selected policy indicators 
Change in policy rates
1  Change in real effective 
exchange rates









China    0    –27 4.2 –1.3 –0.3 –1.0 
Hong Kong    –475    –50  –0.2  –11.3  –3.5  –1.8 
India   –150    –25  2.3 8.7 2.2 3.3 
Indonesia   309    –463 6.7 21.9 12.5  8.7 
Korea    –125    25  0.9 4.0 2.8 3.7 
Malaysia   –50    0  5.6  –4.0 1.2 1.3 
Philippines   –575    –75  3.3  –6.1  3.9  2.6 
Singapore   –169    –19  –2.1 –2.4  0.0  0.4 
Thailand   75    –50  4.0  –3.6 0.8 1.4 
Argentina   –550    250 1.6 –59.5  –1.6  41.1 
Brazil   321   585  –10.1 –32.6  7.7  10.2 
Chile   –107   –350  –9.5  –5.2  2.6  2.8 
Colombia   –219   –318  5.5  –16.1  9.0  8.2 
Mexico   –1029    36  8.0  –9.9  4.4  5.8 
Peru    602    –291 6.7 –4.0 –0.1  1.5 
Venezuela   671   533  4.9  –36.1  12.3  29.9 
Czech Republic    –50    –200  10.2 3.3 4.1 0.6 
Hungary   –125   –125  13.3  8.9  7.0  3.4 
Poland   –750   –475  10.6  –10.0  3.6  0.7 
Russia    613    –971  10.1 –4.8 18.7 15.1 
Israel    –282   374  ...   ...  1.4  6.8 
Saudi Arabia    –446    2 2.2 –7.3  0.0 –0.8 
South Africa    –250   400  –29.6  33.6  4.6  12.2 
Turkey   –300    –1500  –21.3  8.3  68.5  29.7 
1  Policy rate or significant short-term interest rate; in basis points.   
2  Annual percentage changes; an increase indicates an 
appreciation.   
3  End of period. 
Sources: Bloomberg; Datastream; IMF, International Financial Statistics.  
 
Coordinating fiscal and monetary policies 
Why coordinate policy? 
It is also relevant to ask how much the recent monetary policy stance has been influenced by fiscal 
policy considerations. Some argue that, if fiscal policy cannot be expansionary during a slowdown, 
monetary policy should move to fill the gap, given quiescent inflation. For example, according to 
Taylor  (1995, 2000a), when fiscal policy is focused on a medium-term objective or is otherwise BIS Papers No 20  51
 
constrained by a rule, central banks should give more weight to output stabilisation in their reaction 
function.
26  
Others have argued that fiscal and monetary policy may have to move together when uncertainty 
about the impacts of any one particular policy is high. Hence, coordination is critical to achieving the 
maximum policy impact (Blinder (1981)). The need for such a coordinated policy action was, for 
instance, highlighted in 2001 in many industrial and emerging economies when the world economy 
showed persistent weakness, uncertainty about the effects of policy
27 was high and interest rates were 
already low. Many point out that in such circumstances, the strategy should not be to “keep the 
powder dry”
28 but to use all available policy instruments aggressively to enhance policy 
effectiveness.
29 Acting gradually raises the risk that polices may become ineffective (zero interest rate 
bound) and the economy may drift further down.  
On the other hand, a high degree of fiscal imbalance can pose a policy dilemma to the central bank. 
Given the weak fiscal position, a looser monetary policy is likely to raise inflation expectations and 
prove counterproductive to growth. At the same time, a tighter monetary policy can lead to further 
deterioration of fiscal sustainability, with similar results. Monetary policy challenges of this nature have 
been aptly summarised by what Sargent and Wallace (1981) call the “unpleasant monetarist 
arithmetic”. A recent strand of the literature argues that when the actual policy setting is dominated by 
fiscal policy, monetary policy will have little relevance for inflation, with the interest rate and money 
supply becoming endogenous to fiscal policy.
30 When the primary budget balance evolves through the 
political process, and fiscal policy is not anchored by a medium-term rule, the government’s liabilities 
would simply grow out of control, raising expectations that government debts would not be paid by 
raising future taxes.
31 This creates the temptation to reduce the real value of government debt by 
inflation. On the other hand, if the fiscal policy regime is such that the government is committed to 
maintaining fiscal solvency, an independent central bank that responds to a rise in the deficit by raising 
interest rates can force the government to adjust. In such a regime, monetary policy could dominate 
fiscal policy.   
These policy dilemmas are likely to assume added significance when the exchange rate is sensitive to 
fiscal policy. In theory, assuming high capital mobility, a floating exchange rate and a constant risk 
premium, a fiscal expansion is expected to increase (albeit temporarily under perfect capital mobility) 
the domestic interest rate and lead to an appreciation of the exchange rate.
32 Conversely with low 
capital mobility, the exchange rate is expected to depreciate as fiscal expansion spills over to imports 
and raises the current account deficit. In practice, however, the country risk premium may be sensitive 
to fiscal policy, which implies that an increase in the fiscal deficit may, in fact, raise the probability of 
default, leading to currency pressures. Empirical evidence is generally ambiguous about the link 
between fiscal policy and the exchange rate.
33 Nevertheless, the recent experience of many emerging 
economies suggests that under conditions of low fiscal credibility and high exposure to external 
                                                       
26  A counter viewpoint is by Svensson (2002), who argues that central banks should not play an active role in output 
stabilisation but may choose to indirectly accommodate such an objective by focusing on a gradual convergence of inflation 
to the target. He also argues that in countries where inflation targeting is new and central banks have not achieved the 
required credibility to anchor inflation expectations firmly, giving more importance to inflation control may improve output and 
inflation variability and hence result in better price and growth outcomes. 
27  High uncertainty about the effects of policy could mean the possibility of approaching the zero lower bound on interest rate 
faster. 
28  A phrase generally used to represent a cautious policy stance. 
29  This point was, for instance, stressed by Meyer (2001) in justifying the large reduction of interest rate by the Federal 
Reserve during the second half of 2001 when the US economy deteriorated sharply following the events of 11 September.  
30  This view, familiarly known as the fiscal theory of price determination, has been pioneered, among others, by Woodford 
(1995, 2001). See also Canzoneri et al (2001, 2002). 
31  The relevant transmission mechanism is the positive wealth effect in the bondholders’ portfolio, which raises aggregate 
demand and inflation. In such circumstances, the only way to maintain fiscal sustainability and bring about an adjustment in 
the private sector wealth position is to reduce the real value of government debt by keeping interest rates low and increasing 
inflation; see Woodford (2001). 
32  This is the standard prediction by the Mundell-Fleming model with unchanged monetary policy.   
33  See IMF (1995). 52  BIS Papers No 20
 
borrowing, a fiscal expansion is likely to destabilise exchange rate expectations. On the other hand, if 
fiscal consolidation has substantial impacts on confidence, the risk premium may decline and the 
exchange rate may appreciate. 
Coordination in practice 
In practice, however, policy regimes are unlikely to be either extremes of absolute fiscal dominance or 
full monetary independence. There is general agreement that the choice of policy regime is strongly 
influenced by the specific institutional history, and the effectiveness of regimes depends on the degree 
of policy coordination maintained by the government and the central bank. In China, for example, the 
lack of central bank independence has not affected monetary policy effectiveness, nor has it 
constrained the conduct of countercyclical polices. The paper by Li in this volume notes that close 
coordination between fiscal and monetary authorities has been able to contain deflation and promote 
economic activity. While the government introduced fiscal stimulus measures to counter the growth 
slowdown, the central bank played a complementary role by adopting an expansionary monetary 
policy. Perhaps significant in the Chinese case are the administered interest rate structure, a fixed 
exchange rate and a relatively closed financial system that seem to have contained much of the 
potential policy conflicts and their adverse market implications.  
On the other side of the spectrum is Singapore, where fiscal policy has played at the most a passive 
role with a strong preference towards maintaining fiscal prudence. During the current slowdown the 
government has allowed a fiscal deficit. It has, however, used microeconomic policies (tax and 
expenditure policies) to boost the competitiveness of the economy. Moreover, the government’s strong 
fiscal position has facilitated flexible conduct of monetary policy: the central bank has actively used its 
effective exchange rate stance in the current cycle to lower domestic interest rates and strengthen 
external competitiveness.  
Israel’s recent experience demonstrates policy coordination challenges arising from a relatively high 
degree of fiscal dominance. Although the government had publicly committed to end fiscal dominance 
by entering an agreement with the central bank and announcing a deficit target for 2002, its failure to 
maintain this commitment led to an upward shift in the term structure of inflation expectations and 
increased exchange rate volatility. To avert a financial crisis, the central bank had to raise interest 
rates sharply, notwithstanding its negative impacts during a growth slowdown (see the paper by 
Sokoler in this volume). Similarly, in India a high degree of fiscal dominance has been manifest in the 
growing market borrowing requirement of the central government and high real interest rates. As 
pointed out by Mohan in this volume, the conduct of monetary policy has, therefore, increasingly 
reflected fiscal realities and the need to avoid counterproductive outcomes that might arise from policy 
conflicts.  
The experience of Indonesia and Venezuela, for instance, indicates the crucial role of fiscal policy in 
exchange rate developments and its implications for monetary policy. Both countries had to tighten 
monetary policy sharply following large exchange rate depreciations caused, among other factors, by 
markets’ losing confidence in fiscal policy. Colombia confronted a similar policy dilemma, given its 
weak fiscal position, increasing dollarisation and a high pass-through of exchange rate changes into 
prices. Under such circumstances, an expansionary fiscal policy raised the risk of devaluation and 
high inflation with counterproductive implications for the economy (see Uribe and Lozano in this 
volume).  
Turkey’s experience last year demonstrated the critical role of policy coordination in crisis 
management. Following the abandonment of the crawling peg after the early 2001 crisis, the central 
bank and the government maintained tight policy coordination to restore market confidence in the 
exchange rate: an important element in this coordination was the timely increase in interest rates and 
overachievement of primary surplus by the government. Citing Turkey’s experience, Binay argues in 
this volume that crisis situations require stronger fiscal and monetary coordination to reduce their 
potentially damaging implications in a more integrated financial market.    
The recent policy mix 
Table 7 shows the major episodes of fiscal adjustment in emerging economies since 1990 and the 
stance of monetary policy during these adjustments. As may be seen, the policy mix has varied 
significantly across economies. For example, large fiscal expansions in Chile, Hong Kong and BIS Papers No 20  53
 
South  Africa at different points of time during the 1990s were accompanied by a contractionary 
monetary policy. 
 
Table 7  
Major episodes of fiscal adjustment and the stance of monetary policy 






China 1998  1.2  N 
Hong Kong  1998  2.5  C 
India 1991  –2.4  E 
 1993  1.3  E 
 1994  –1.2  E 
 1998  1.7  E 
Indonesia Before  1998
4  –1.0 N 
Korea 1998  1.2  E 
Malaysia 1998  2.5  E 
 2001  2.1  E 
Philippines 2000  4.0  N
5 
Singapore 1998  9.0  N 
 2001  9.0  N 
Thailand 1990  1.7   
 1992  –2.0   
 1997  –4.2   
      
Brazil 1999  –3.2  C 
Chile 1997-1999  3.1  C 
 1999-2000  –1.4  N 
Colombia 1992-1993  1.3  E 
 1999-2000  2.1  E 
Mexico 1995  –2.6  C 
Peru 2001  0.6  E 
      
Czech Republic  2000  –2.2  E 
 2001  –2.8  E 
Hungary 1995  5.7  E 
 1996  2.2  E 
Poland 2001  ...  E 
Russia 1998  –5.7  C 
 2001  2.9  N 
      
Israel 1997  –1.8   
South Africa  1991  –2.8  E 
 1994  2.0  C 
1  The year in which the government implemented a large (amounting to at least ±1% of GDP in a single year) discretionary 
programme during the period 1990-2002.     
2    Change in the government balance as a percentage of GDP.
3  E: expansionary; N: neutral; C: contractionary.   
4  After 1998 the budget deficit as a percentage of GDP declines every 
year by 25% on average and monetary policy is considered neutral.   
5  Contractionary episodes in May, September and 
October.    
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In a large number of countries, however, historical experience suggests that monetary policy was also 
expansionary during the years when fiscal deficits registered a sharp increase (for example, Colombia 
in the early and late 1990s, India and Korea in 1998, Hungary in 1995 and 1996, Malaysia in 2001-02 
and Peru in 2001). To the extent that it is fiscal policy that moved first this may indicate the 
accommodating nature of monetary policy. In some countries - for instance, Korea in 1998 - it may 
also indicate a simultaneous movement to expansionary fiscal and monetary policy to stimulate 
demand following a large external shock. 
Another aspect of the historical experience has been that major fiscal contractions have been 
accompanied by an expansionary or neutral monetary policy (for example, Chile in 1999-2000, the 
Czech Republic in 2000-01, India in 1991 and 1994 and South Africa in 1991). This may indicate that 
policy coordination was aimed at reducing downside risks to the economy and avoiding a 
simultaneous contraction of fiscal and monetary policies.   
To highlight the nature of the policy mix in the current slowdown, Graph 1 plots changes in policy rates 
(or alternatively short-term interest rates) and changes in the fiscal deficit of the general government 
between 2000 and 2002, in both emerging and industrial economies. Both fiscal and monetary policies 
have been expansionary in a majority of industrial countries: a similar pattern is also discernible in 
some emerging economies. On balance, however, monetary policy seems to have played a relatively 
greater role than fiscal policy. This is particularly true of emerging economies - where the scale of 
interest rate changes has been substantial (for instance, Mexico, Poland, Peru and the Philippines).  
 
 
Regional differences in policy mix also appear to remain high. In Asia, the reliance on fiscal policy has 
been significant in some economies (for example, Hong Kong and Singapore), while many have 
relaxed monetary policy. In Korea, the policy mix seems to have undergone a significant change after 
the recent financial crisis. Prior to the 1997-98 crisis, the government largely relied on monetary policy 
for demand management and followed strict fiscal discipline. However, the government switched to an 
expansionary fiscal policy immediately following the crisis as monetary policy was relatively ineffective 
in view of the large financial shock. In the more recent period, monetary policy has played an active 
stabilisation role, with fiscal policy helping to restructure the financial system. In India, a relatively high 
fiscal imbalance appears to have shifted the adjustment to monetary policy for reviving growth in the 
past two years. A similar policy mix has been noticeable in the Philippines.  
In Latin America, with the exception of Chile, fiscal policy was largely contractionary. Monetary policy 
played a comparatively active role in stabilisation in Mexico, where an appreciating exchange rate was 
the key factor, and in Peru, where inflation fell to negative levels in 2001. In Argentina, both fiscal and 
monetary polices have been tightened following the recent financial crisis. Brazil tightened monetary 
policy further in 2002: fiscal policy also moved to a tighter stance measured by the primary budget 
balance. In central and eastern Europe, both fiscal and monetary policies have been easier; for 
instance, in Poland, the Czech Republic and Russia. 
























































1 As a percentage of GDP.     2 Changes over the period 2000-2002.
Sources: Bloomberg; national data.
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5.   Public debt and monetary policy  
Traditionally, the size of deficits rather than the composition and maturity of public debt has been the 
focus of monetary policy. However, this perception seems to be changing rapidly. One important 
reason might be the recent increase in the frequency of emerging market financial crises, with origins 
in maturity and currency mismatches in the public and private sectors.
34 Many argue that an 
imbalanced public debt structure - too high a concentration of short-term and/or foreign currency 
denominated securities - can aggravate financial uncertainty and restrain monetary policy from taking 
strong actions or even undermine its effectiveness. The increased use of price- and exchange rate- 
indexed bonds may be yet another reason why monetary policy challenges could be heightened by 
the composition of public debt. Thus debt composition might have an independent influence from debt 
maturity (the problem of bunching repayments), although both factors have often played a combined 
role in many recent financial crises.  
Tables 8 and 9 provide some important statistics about government debts in emerging economies and 
how countries have financed their fiscal deficits over the past three years. A few aspects are worth 
noting. The conventionally defined short-term debt (fixed rate debts of less than one year original 
maturity) does not appear to account for a large share of total debt, except in central and eastern 
Europe, Mexico and the Philippines (Table 8).
35 This may be partly attributable to the development of a 
domestic bond market in recent years and partly to the recent sharp decline in borrowing from central 
banks. For example, during 2000 to 2002 domestic long-term marketable bonds financed about 55% 
of fiscal deficits in Asia, about 60% in Latin America and a little over 36% in central and eastern 
Europe (Table 9). In Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, the Philippines, Poland and South Africa the shares 
exceeded 70%. Excepting Brazil and Thailand, central bank financing was negligible or even 
contracted in some countries.  
Second, debts linked to short-term interest rates, and other variables such as inflation and the 
exchange rate, constitute a large part of the total debt in Latin America as well as in Hungary, 
Indonesia and Turkey (Table 8). Third, outstanding foreign currency denominated debts of the 
government remain sizeable in most emerging economies (excepting India) in relation to their total 
debt, with ratios exceeding 80% in Argentina, Peru and Russia and over 40% in many others. This 
suggests a high degree of exposure of governments in emerging economies to the global financial 
environment and exchange rate movements. It is, however, important to note that most countries have 
avoided financing deficit through short-term external borrowing (less than one-year maturity) during 
the past three years (Table 9). Most external borrowings have been long-term, although in many 
cases, through floating rate notes.  
Implications of debt maturity 
Notwithstanding the reduction in short-term financing, the increase in the size of government 
borrowing and its concentration in few maturities have resulted in a debt profile with low average 
remaining  maturity in many countries.  As the Table A2 in the annex shows, the average remaining 
maturity of public debt was less than three years in Brazil, Hong Kong,
36 Hungary, Mexico and Poland 
at the end of 2000. Moreover, a significant percentage of debt was concentrated in maturities below 
one year. The typical ratio is about 30 to 60% in Latin America, over 40% in Hungary and 20% in 
Poland, suggesting a relatively high rollover rate of borrowing. 
                                                       
34  A recent study documenting evidence on this aspect is Goldstein and Turner (2003).  
35  From a theoretical perspective, Barro (1998) shows that an optimal debt management strategy for the government is to 
place all its debt at the long end (by issuing consols) and index them to inflation. This would not only provide a complete 
hedge to the government against unexpected changes in expenditure but also allow it to smooth tax changes over time. 
Moreover, it would remove inflationary bias from fiscal policy by reducing the incentive to use inflation for reducing the debt 
burden. In practice, however, countries rely on short-term financing. The reasons may include the underdevelopment of 
domestic bond markets and a volatile financial environment, which either make long-term financing difficult or raise the cost 
of such financing.  
36  Hong Kong’s outstanding debt mainly refers to the exchange fund bills and notes issued by the central bank in recent years 
to develop the local bond market and does not reflect borrowing by the public sector.  56  BIS Papers No 20
 
Table 8 
Proportion of outstanding government debt at end-2001 (original maturity) 
  Domestic currency debt 









China   –  100.0   –  –  –  – 
India  1.3  93.9   –  0.1   –  4.7 
Indonesia –  12.1  17.2 15.8  2.7 52.2 
Korea  0.4  74.7   –  –  –  24.9 
Malaysia  3.0  80.0   .  .  .  16.7 
Philippines  18.0  34.0   –  –  –  48.0 
Singapore
3  0.0  24.1  66.0   –  –  – 
Thailand  7.1  57.5   –  –  –  35.5 
Argentina …  …  …  …  …  97.0 
Brazil 1.6  3.9  40.4 7.9  20.4  25.5 
Colombia 0.1  17.2    –  25.5  4.3  50.0 
Mexico 27.2  28.2  13.3 2.2 0.0  29.0 
Peru  2.0  2.0   –  11.0   –  85.0 
Czech  Republic  46.2  37.0   –  1.2   –  – 
Hungary 20.0  36.4  13.3 1.6    –  29.7 
Poland  12.4  34.3  9.1   –  –  34.8 
Russia  0.4  11.1   –  0.5   –  88.0 
Israel 2.5  22.2  1.8 47.0  3.0 23.5 
South Africa  5.2  75.3 1.3 3.2    –  15.0 
Turkey 8.9  0.6  21.0 11.7 12.9 44.9 
1  With a maturity of less than one year.   
2  With a maturity with more than one year.   
3  10% of the domestic currency debt is 
placed in Treasury bills. 
Source: Central banks. 
 
One implication of a high refunding requirement is that it might raise refinancing risks for the 
government and make public debt unsustainable. Moreover, the recent literature has identified several 
routes through which a high degree of debt rollover can generate potential confidence problems in the 
financial sector.
37 One such route has been the probability that this might create self-fulfilling 
expectations of a type of bank run, where expectations of partial debt repudiation or debt monetisation 
raise the risk premium required by investors.
38 This, in turn, creates a situation when it pays for the 
government to fulfil such expectations by defaulting on its liabilities or switching to monetary financing 
of the deficit. Others show that in countries with partially or fully fixed exchange rates, high refinancing 
                                                       
37  See, for example, Calvo (1998) and Giavazzi and Pagano (1990b). 
38  A familiar example of a debt run is the confidence crisis in the Italian government bond market in the late 1980s, when the 
government ran a high debt rollover risk and the yield on its treasury bills exceeded that on the private certificate of deposit 
of similar maturity. Alesina et al (1990) argue that in such a situation it would have paid the government to “bite the bullet” by 
issuing long-term debt even if it implied a higher risk premium. BIS Papers No 20  57
 
risks ultimately result in devaluation. This occurs as the timing of a currency attack generally coincides 
with the dates when the government has a large refunding requirement. 
Table 9 
Financing of government deficit
1 
 Domestic  External 
 Marketable   
 Short-term
2  Long-term 
Non-
marketable  Short-term





China 3.3  55.7  41.0    .    .    . 
India 2.4  44.7  51.1   –  1.8  –0.1 
Korea 6.2  76.9  16.7    –    –  0.2 
Malaysia
3   ...  80.8    ...   ...  19.2    ... 
Philippines –9.7  71.3  7.7    –  30.7    – 
Singapore 9.6  23.5  66.9    .    .    . 
Thailand  19.3  30.1   –   –  24.2  5.7 
Argentina 16.2  47.0  11.7   –  25.1    – 
Brazil 33.8  70.3  –41.0   –  30.7  6.2 
Chile   –  –  –   –  209.0  –109.0 
Colombia 1.5  67.9  –    –  30.8    – 
Mexico 12.1  97.8  –29.0  0.6  18.5    . 
Peru 0.0  15.3  6.0  –2.0  54.3    – 
Czech Republic  46.8  37.0  –    –    –    – 
Hungary 62.5  31.9  0.0    –  5.6    – 
Poland 14.3  72.7  31.8   –  –17.7  –1.1 
Russia –5.3  4.8  –5.0    –  58.0    – 
Israel
3   –  61.3  25.4   –  13.4    – 
South Africa
3  –11.0 88.1  –13.3   –  87.5    – 
Turkey 38.7  40.7  0.0 0.7 19.7    – 
1  As a percentage of total financing. Averages for 2000-02 period.   
2  Up to one year maturity.   
3  2000-01.  
Source: Central banks. 
 
It is generally agreed that government’s refunding requirement - as distinct from net borrowing 
requirements - have played an important role in many recent episodes of emerging market crisis. For 
example, in Argentina, a high debt refinancing need of the government is said to have precipitated the 
recent crisis, leading to abandonment of the currency board. In Brazil and Turkey, domestic 
refinancing risks played a major role in the crises, although both countries had adequately covered 
their foreign financing needs. One indicator of potential challenges posed by future debt repayment 
needs is the maturity profile of domestic and foreign debt in emerging economies in the next few years 
(Table 10). Many countries continue to face a high degree of debt rollover risk. For instance, the ratio 
of domestic debt falling due for repayment in 2003 (without considering the fresh borrowing in that 
year) ranges between 30 and 45% in Brazil, Hungary, Poland and Turkey, and between 15 and 20% 
in many others.  58  BIS Papers No 20
 
Table 10 
Maturity profile of government debt as of 2002
1 
% of total domestic debt  
falling due for repayment 
% of total foreign debt  
falling due for repayment 
 
2003 2004 2005  Beyond 
2005  2003 2004 2005  Beyond 
2005 
India 5.0  6.0  6.0  83.0   –   –   –   – 
Indonesia 13.5  18.5  17.8  49.7 12.2 11.2 11.0 27.4 
Korea  12.6 19.8 18.3 60.3 9.5  18.1  16.9  55.5 
Malaysia 19.8  16.8  13.5  49.9 22.3  4.0 12.2 61.5 
Philippines 19.0  13.0  20.0 48.0  6.0  6.0  7.0 81.0 
Thailand 15.0  9.7  6.7  68.6 11.5  7.6 10.0 70.8 
Argentina 0.5  0.4  1.5  15.6 16.3 11.3  7.1 32.8 
Brazil  29.0 14.6  8.7 27.6 18.5 12.4  9.6 55.4 
Chile   –   –   –   –  6.2  5.9  8.8  73.2 
Colombia 10.1  12.2  9.1  48.7 15.3  9.9 10.8 49.9 
Mexico 20.1  23.6  12.2  44.2 13.1  9.1  7.7 70.1 
Peru 7.0  6.0  6.0  81.0 5.0 6.0 6.0  83.0 
Czech Republic  28.2  7.6  5.4  52.4   –   –   –   – 
Hungary 42.4  10.1  16.9  30.6 16.0 16.7 19.4 47.9 
Poland  31.0 11.4  8.4 29.5 6.4 9.3  10.0  69.3 
Russia  15.6 12.1  2.8 69.5 12.3  8.2  9.7 69.8 
Israel  8.6  7.4  9.6  70.7   –   –   –   – 
South Africa  1.8  7.2  7.3 73.0  2.9 25.5  0.6 71.1 
Turkey 42.6  31.0  19.3  7.0 11.1 16.1 16.8 56.0 
1 Relates to different months for different countries. 
Source: Central banks. 
 
Implications of rollover risk may also depend on who holds the debt. Despite the recent reduction in 
reserve and liquidity requirements, freeing banks from buying guaranteed bonds, banks still absorb a 
significant part of the government long-term debt issues in emerging economies (Table 11). In most 
countries, banks are generally required to mark their bond portfolio (especially held for trading) to 
market; see Mohanty (2002). In a declining interest rate environment banks may be willing to absorb 
additional government bonds at lower interest costs in view of the capital gains. But such a situation 
would reverse if markets begin to expect higher interest rates. If banks are weak and unable to absorb 
capital loss without impairing their profitability this could pose difficult challenges for monetary policy.  BIS Papers No 20  59
 
Table 11 
Buyers of long-term government debt
1 
  Banks  Pension funds 
and others  Central bank  Non-residents 
 
1995 2002 1995 2002 1995 2002 1995 2002 
China   ...  50.3    ...  49.7  ...   ...   ...   ... 
India   ...  4.5    ...  49.0 0.7 25.3 6.0  11.7 
Indonesia   –  –    – –   –  100.0  –   – 
Korea   ...  37.1    ...  57.7  ...    ...  ...   ... 
Malaysia
2 13.9  23.3
3  73.8 74.6
3  2.8 0.2
3  2.9 0.2
3 
Thailand   ...  74.7    ...  19.3  .    .   .   . 
Argentina   ...  ...    ...  48.0
3   ...    ...  ...  52.0 
Brazil 48.0
4  55.6 50.7
  42.0  ...    ...  ...   ... 
Chile   ...  5.0    ... ...   ...    ...  ...  95.0 
Colombia 5.9  13.2  23.8  28.8 10.6  2.3 18.2  34.9 
Mexico –7.8  –2.0  119.1  101.8 –9.3   – 80.4  1.2 
Peru   –  8.0    –  5.0  –    –  –  87.0 
Czech Republic  85.1 56.4  7.5 32.0    ...    ...  7.4 11.6 
Hungary 25.1  0.5
3  17.7  ...  48.4  –  0.5   ... 
Poland 46.8  72.7
3  37.2 15.6  9.9  11.6
3  6.0 11.7
3 
Russia   ...  82.0    ...  11.9  ...    ...  ...  6.1 
Israel 28.0  14.1
3  68.6 82.0
3  2.9 3.7
3  0.5 0.2 
Turkey 51.4  69.9  2.6  3.0  28.5  5.6  .   . 
1  As a percentage of new bond issues.   
2  As a percentage of outstanding domestic debt.   
3  2001.   
4  1999. 
Source: Central banks. 
Implications of debt composition  
How far does the composition of public debt matter for the conduct of monetary policy? It is well 
recognised that the choice of debt instruments is determined by debt management considerations. 
The existence of a large variety of sovereign debt instruments is generally seen to enhance the depth 
of the domestic bond market, facilitating the conduct of monetary policy.
39 In some cases, the choice 
of debt instruments and timing of their issue may also complement monetary policy objectives. For 
example, inflation-indexed bonds have not only been preferred to lengthen the average maturity 
structure of the debt by tapping institutions which are willing to hold them, but they have also been 
increasingly used as an indicator of inflation expectations for the conduct of monetary policy. A similar 
argument could apply to bonds indexed to the exchange rate to the extent that they lower the risk 
premium the government otherwise has to pay on non-indexed bonds.  
On the other hand, the experience of recent financial crises suggests that a high degree of financial 
indexation and exposure to foreign financing may constrain monetary policy in times of heightened 
market uncertainty. For example, while a sharp depreciation of the exchange rate may require an 
increase in the interest rate, a high concentration of debt instruments indexed to the short-term interest 
rate and exchange rate is likely to worsen the public debt dynamics. This may undermine fiscal 
credibility in the presence of an existing fiscal imbalance and thus aggravate financial uncertainty.  
                                                       
39  See, for example, Mohanty (2002). 60  BIS Papers No 20
 
It is argued that economies with a large unhedged foreign currency debt (in either the public or private 
sector) are less likely to rely on orthodox policy prescriptions; see Goldstein and Turner (2003). A 
conventional recommendation in the event of an external demand shock is to reduce the interest rate. 
However, in the presence of a large currency mismatch, such a policy may induce capital flight and 
lead to a precipitous fall in the exchange rate, causing widespread bankruptcies in the economy. Nor 
is raising interest rates to defend the exchange rate likely to be helpful because this may adversely 
affect growth and further weaken investors who have borrowed in domestic currency. Some point out 
that the perceived advantage of inflation targeting of permitting greater exchange rate flexibility may 
be less with a large currency mismatch.
40 In such circumstances, exchange rate depreciations are 
likely to have significant contractionary effects through the balance sheet route. For this reason, 
central banks may still be unwilling to let the exchange rate move even if longer-run inflation 
expectations are anchored by the inflation targeting regime.  
The recent experience of Turkey and Brazil illustrates some of these policy challanges. In Turkey, 
following the 2001 crisis, the government converted a large part of short-term debts assumed from the 
financial system (including the central bank) to long-term domestic bonds linked to the exchange rate 
and short-term interest rates. These swaps resulted in transferring the bulk of market risks from the 
banking system to the government, worsening the fiscal situation further; see the paper by Binay in 
this volume. Brazil’s experience in 2001 demonstrated a similar problem. While the financial 
uncertainty made the domestic yield curve steeper, reducing fixed rate debt issuance, the government 
increased the issuance of dollar-indexed bonds to contain exchange rate expectations.
41 This, in turn, 
worsened the fiscal situation in the following year as the exchange rate fell and debt service payments 
on dollar-indexed bonds and foreign currency debts swelled. Similarly, in Indonesia, the recent 
increase in debt service payments largely reflects the additional servicing cost on indexed bonds 
(issued following the 1997-98 crisis for restructuring the financial system) arising from the relatively 
high rates of inflation and currency depreciation.  
Long-term interest rates and the role of policy   
An important issue is the extent to which the recent monetary easing has been able to bring down 
long-term interest rates. As Table 12 shows, nominal long-term rates have fallen in all countries 
(covered in the table) during 2001 and 2002, reflecting the reduction in the short-term interest rates. 
Apart from lower policy rates, long-term interest rates in some countries (for example India) have also 
been driven by a large increase in the purchase of bonds by banks, a development attributed to an 
increased flight to quality brought about by economic uncertainty. At the same time, despite an easier 
monetary policy the spread between the short and long rates has widened in many Asian economies 
(see Annex Table A3). This may indicate some weakening of the influence of monetary policy on long-
term rates. The widening term spreads may also reflect other factors, including future growth and 
inflation prospects and a shift in the term premium.  
Another aspect is that the fall in the long-term real interest rates has been much smaller than that in 
the nominal rates. Ex post long-term real interest rates (adjusted for actual inflation), in fact, rose in 
many countries in 2002 (Table 13). The decline in inflation is probably one offsetting factor to 
monetary easing. Moreover, to the extent that expected and actual inflation diverge, the ex ante real 
rates could be much different from ex post rates. Given that expected inflation adjusts gradually, it 
could be argued that this factor might delay the accrual of some of the obvious advantages of low 
inflation. 
 
                                                       
40  See Eichengreen (2002). He argues that “inflation targeting and a hard peg are basically indistinguishable” in an economy 
with large unhedged dollar liabilities.  
41   The outstanding dollar-indexed bonds peaked at 33% of total debt in October 2001 from 22% in December 2000, reflecting 
both the net issuance and the exchange rate depreciation; see Figueiredo et al (2002). The paper by Goldfajn in this volume 
points out that exchange rate depreciation alone enlarged Brazil’s debt/GDP ratio by 14 percentage points between 1994 







3   
2000 2001 2002 2000 2001 2002 
Asia
4  5.8 4.8 3.6 8.5 7.3 6.5 
Hong Kong  6.2  3.6 1.8 7.4 6.0 5.3 
India  9.0 7.5 6.0 11.1  9.3  7.5 
Korea   5.1  4.7  4.2 9.4 7.1 6.7 
Malaysia 3.2  3.3  3.2 5.9 4.2 4.2 
Philippines 10.8  9.8 7.2  15.5  15.9  13.4 
Singapore 2.4  1.9  0.9 4.4 3.6 3.6 
Thailand 3.6  2.9  2.1 6.2 5.1 4.2 
Latin America
4  12.7 9.2 5.7 6.5 5.9 4.7 
Chile   9.2  6.2  3.9 6.4 5.2 4.1 
Mexico   16.2  12.3  7.5 6.6 6.6 5.4 
Central Europe
4  11.5 10.7  7.2 10.4 9.4 7.6 
Czech Republic  5.2  5.1 3.6 8.0 7.4 6.4 
Hungary 11.0  10.7  8.9 9.1 8.5 7.8 
Poland   18.3  16.4  9.1 14.0 12.3  7.9 
Israel  9.3 6.8 6.4 6.7 6.0 5.5 
South Africa  10.4 10.0 11.9 13.8 11.3 12.1 
Memo:        
United States  6.2  3.9 1.7 6.0 5.0 4.6 
Euro area  4.1  4.4 3.3 5.2 4.5 4.3 
United Kingdom  5.9  5.0 3.9 5.3 5.0 4.9 
1  Annual average.   
2  Three-month interest rate.   
3  Ten-year or nearest long-term rate.   
4  Simple average of the countries 
shown. 
Sources: Bloomberg; Datastream; national data. 
 
Nevertheless, it remains unclear what is driving long-term interest rates. Movement of long-term 
interest rates may depend on several factors. The impact of monetary policy on long rates is said to 
depend not only on the current policy rate but also on expectations about future policy rates. Some 
argue that, since the term structure of interest rate incorporates investors’ best forecast about future 
short rates, the degree of persistence (moving in steps in one direction) in the policy rate could be a 
significant determinant of long rates.
42 Another view is that aggressive moves (a few large changes in 
one direction) in the policy rate are more effective in influencing the long-term rates because they 
provide a strong indication of the central banks’ intention and hence have greater influence on 
investors’ confidence. 
Evidence suggests that fiscal policy has been a major determinant of long-term rates in industrial and 
emerging economies. Much of this impact has been explained through the risk premium associated 
with long-term sustainability of fiscal policy as well as changes in saving and investment balances due 
to fiscal policy; see Group of Ten (1995). Another important factor has been the greater arbitrage 
opportunities brought about by international capital flows. According to this view, uncovered interest 
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parity conditions and hence exchange rate expectations explain much of the movement in long-term 







3   
2000 2001 2002 2000 2001 2002 
Asia
4  3.9 2.2  2.6 6.7 4.7  5.5 
India 3.7  2.2  3.7 5.8  4.0 5.4 
Hong Kong  9.9  5.2 5.2  11.1 7.6  8.7 
Korea   2.9  0.6  1.3 7.1  3.0 4.1 
Malaysia 1.7  1.9  1.4 4.3  2.8 2.3 
Philippines 6.5  3.7 4.0  11.2 9.8  10.3 
Singapore 0.9  0.8  1.4 2.9  2.5 4.1 
Thailand 2.0  1.2  1.6 4.7  3.5 3.9 
Latin America
4  6.8 4.3  2.0 0.8 1.0  1.1 
Chile   5.4  2.6  1.5 2.6  1.6 1.9 
Mexico   8.3  6.1  2.4 –1.1  0.4  0.3 
Central Europe
4  3.5 4.2  4.1 2.4 2.9  4.1 
Czech Republic  1.3  0.4 1.7  4.1 2.7  4.1 
Hungary 1.2  1.4  3.3 –0.7  –0.7  2.2 
Poland   8.1  10.8  7.3 3.9  6.8 6.1 
Israel   8.2 5.7  0.6 5.6 4.9  0.2 
South Africa  5.0 4.3  2.2 8.4 5.5  3.3 
1  Interest rates minus consumer price inflation; annual average.   
2  Three-month interest rate.   
3  Ten-year or nearest 
long-term rate.   
4  Simple average of the countries shown. 
Sources: Bloomberg; Datastream; national data. 
 
Others argue that much depends on the policy mix.
43 According to this view, a looser monetary policy 
may not be successful in keeping the long-term rates lower in the presence of a high level of public 
debt. Hence, a policy mix favourable to long-term interest rates would be to move towards a tighter 
fiscal and looser monetary policy. The argument is that, while a sound fiscal policy would encourage 
saving, driving down the long-term real interest rate, monetary policy anchored on price stability would 
smooth much of the short-term movement of the real interest rate. 
Table A4 in the Annex shows what central banks in emerging economies regard as the plausible 
determinants of long-term interest rates. These include the monetary policy rate, fiscal policy, inflation 
and exchange rate expectations and world interest rates, although the extent to which each of these 
factors dominates the long-term rate varies across countries. For example, in Korea, the influence of 
monetary policy on long-term rates has increased recently with the shift to an interest rate oriented 
operating procedure. Korea’s experience also suggests that, while inflation has a major impact on the 
interest rate, this effect is significant with a lag of about one year. Moreover, the spread between the 
short and long rates explains a large component of the business cycle in recent years. In India, 
monetary policy influence on long-term rates has increased with the central bank shifting to an active 
                                                       
43  See Allsopp and Glyn (1999). BIS Papers No 20  63
 
liquidity management policy. Fiscal and inflation expectations seem to explain a large part of long-term 
interest rate movements in Hungary. Expectations of future EMU accession as well as a time-varying 
currency premium have also been important. In relatively open economies, such as Singapore, 
international interest rates play a more important role in the determination of the long-term interest 
rate. 64  BIS Papers No 20
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Annex 
Table A1  
Budget deficits adjusted for the cycle and other factors 
  Adjustments made for 
the cycle  
Adjustments made for 
the temporary impact 
of other factors 
Fiscal impulse 
calculation   Other 
China Yes  Yes   
(temporary cancellation of 
fixed investment tax)     
Hong Kong  No  No  No  No 
India   Yes     
Indonesia No  Yes  Yes   
Korea  Yes (OECD structural balance 
concept) 
No  Yes (IMF fiscal impulse 
concept) 
 
Malaysia  Yes, (cyclically neutral 
balance using 1995 as the 
base year) 
None Yes   
Singapore 
No 
In 1997, compensation to 
telecommunications 
company and payment for 
land acquisition 






Thailand No  No  Yes  No 
Brazil No       
Chile  Yes  Yes; copper price  No   
Colombia Yes  No  No   
Mexico  Yes (estimation of structural 
budget)  
Yes, exclusion of 
non-recurrent revenues 
from the public balance  
Fiscal impulse calculated 
from the indicator of fiscal 
impact on aggregate 
demand (IMF,OECD, 
Dutch impulse measures) 
Fiscal impact on 
aggregate 
demand 











Hungary No  Extraordinary expenditures, 
which have no impact on 
demand at the time of their 
recording in the budget 
Calculated as the yearly 
change of the SNA 
primary balances 
 
Poland  Yes (via estimated output 
gap) 
No  Yes (change in the 
composition of 
expenditure, income and 
government financing 
taken into account) 
No 
Russia  No  Creation of a “Finance 
reserve” in the federal 
budget to accumulate 
additional revenue for future 
external debt redemption  
   
Israel No  No  No  No 
South Africa  No  No  No  No 
Turkey No  No  No  No 
Source: Central banks. 68  BIS Papers No 20
 
Table A2 
Maturity distribution of outstanding government bonds in 2000 by remaining maturity  
(% of outstanding debt) 
  Less than 1 
year 
Between 1 
and 5 years 
Between 5 




Hong Kong  74  20  6    –  1.2 
India  4 36 37 23   ... 
Indonesia  4 34 62    – 6.0 
Korea
1  6 77 13  4  5.2 
Malaysia  18 52 20 10  4.7 
Philippines  9 27 30 34 14.7 
Singapore  31 38 31    – 4.1 
Thailand  15 48 37    ...    ... 
Brazil 42  42  6  10  2.5 
Chile 45  20
2 35
3   –   ... 
Colombia  30 42 20  8  3.5 
Mexico 58  40  2    –  1.5 
Peru  20 56 42    – 6.4 
Hungary  44 45 11    – 2.3 
Poland 20  71  9    –  2.6 
Israel  18 54 27  2  11.0
4 and 3.6
5 
Saudi  Arabia  7 34 30 29  6.0 
Memo       
United States
1 21  62    –  17    ... 
Japan
1 5  8  78  9    ... 
Germany
1  2 32 61  5   ... 
United Kingdom
1  7 29 34 30   ... 
1  Distribution by original maturity.   
2  Maturity between one and three years.   
3  Maturity over three years.   
4  International.   
5  Domestic. 
Source: Central banks. 
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Table A3 
   Spread and correlation between long- and short-term interest rates 
Spread
1 Correlation
2   
2000 2001 2002  2000/02 
India  2.02 1.82 1.47 0.93 
Hong  Kong  1.18 2.38 3.47 0.86 
Korea  4.24 2.35 2.41 0.66 
Malaysia  2.67 0.91 0.94  –0.53 
Philippines  4.67 6.12 6.21 0.82 
Singapore  2.01 1.65 2.68 0.56 
Thailand  2.64 2.28 2.09 0.54 
Chile  –2.81 –1.02 –0.23  0.79 
Mexico  –9.50 –5.67 –2.03  0.86 
Czech  Republic  2.81 2.32 2.57 0.63 
Hungary  –1.96 –2.23 –1.08  0.81 
Poland  –4.26 –4.07 –1.16  0.96 
Israel  –2.59 –0.77 –0.62  0.86 
South Africa  3.40 1.29  –0.13  –0.16 
1    Average long-term (mostly 10-year) government bond rates minus average short-term (mostly three-month) interest 
rates.    
2  Between short and long rates; average over the period calculated on levels.  
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